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New York Court of Appeals creates an exception to employment at-
will doctrine for attorneys who blow the whistle on unethical
colleagues
For almost a century, New York courts have adhered to the
common-law doctrine of at-will employment.' This doctrine
presumes an employment relationship to be terminable by either
party, for any reason, at any time, leaving the employee with no
legal redress against the employer for wrongful discharge.2 State
courts in many jurisdictions have fashioned various contract and
tort law exceptions to this rule, such as the public policy excep-
tion,3 the implied contract exception,4 the covenant of good faith
1 See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417
(1895). Martin was the seminal employment at-will decision in New York. Id. In
holding that the plaintiffs hiring was at-will and terminable at any time by the de-
fendant employer, the court stated: "[Tihe rule is inflexible that a general or indefi-
nite hiring is, prima facie, a hiring at-will; and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." Id. (citing HORACE G.
WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 134 (2d ed. 1877). See
generally Peter S. Partee, Special Project: Reversing the Presumption of Employment
At Will, 44 VAND. L. REv. 689, 690 (1991) (discussing origin of at-will employment
doctrine).
2 See, e.g., Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 159, 156 N.E.2d 297, 298, 182
N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (1959) (discharging employee from employment at-will would not
give rise to cause of action for breach of contract); Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock and
Repair Co., 249 N.Y. 439, 444, 164 N.E. 342, 344 (1928) (using phrase "permanent
employmentP at time of hiring does not create obligation to employ plaintiff beyond
time which defendant has use for plaintiffs services); Martin, 148 N.Y. at 121, 42
N.E. at 417 ("[H]iring of the plaintiff was a hiring at-will and the defendant was at
liberty to terminate the same at any time."); Grozek v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 63 A.D.2d
858, 858, 406 N.Y.S.2d 213, 214 (4th Dep't 1978) (stating that employee without term
agreement may be discharged at any time, with or without cause); Chase v. United
Hosp., 60 A.D.2d 558, 559, 400 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (1st Dep't 1977) (finding letter of
employment without fixed term gave employer right to discharge employee at any
time); see also Partee, supra note 1, at 690 (estimating that "up to seventy-five mil-
lion employees are subject to this harsh dismissal standard").
3 The public policy exception, adopted by a majority of the states, allows an at-
will employee to maintain a tort or contract action against his employer for discharge
that contravenes public policy. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (1983)
("[Eistablishing a claim under this doctrine requires that a 'clearly defined and well-
established public policy' be threatened by the defendant's action." (quoting Ward v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980))); see also Partee, supra
note 1, at 693-99; Susan Topper Travis, Abusive-Discharge Cases to Test Common-
Law Rule, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1982, at 1; see, e.g., Peterman v. International Board of
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding discharge of at-will employee
because of his refusal to commit peijury was illegal and against state policy).
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and fair dealing exception,5 as well as statutory exceptions.6 In
1982, in Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., the New York Court of Ap-
peals recognized the implied contract exception to the at-will doc-
New York has rejected the public policy exception on the grounds that the legisla-
ture, not the judiciary, should bear responsibility for reforming the at-will doctrine.
See, e.g., Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 336, 506 N.E.2d 919, 923, 514
N.Y.S.2d 209, 213 (1987) ("[S]ignificant alteration of employment relationships ... is
best left to the Legislature."); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
302, 448 N.E.2d 86, 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236 (1983) ("If the rule of nonliability for
termination of an at-will employment is to be tempered, it should be accomplished
through a principled statutory scheme [not judicial intervention].").
4 See Partee, supra note 1, at 697-98. Under this exception, certain types of em-
ployer conduct or statements are held to create an implied promise of tenure, which
may rise to the level of contractualobligations. Id. Courts have found this exception
to exist when assurances have been placed in employee manuals stating that an em-
ployee would not be fired except for good reason, or when employees are able to show
detrimental reliance to support an inference of intent to create job security. See, e.g.,
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (holding
that policy statements in employee handbook give rise to implied contractual rights).
But cf Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty To
Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1820 (1980) [hereinafter
Wrongful Discharge] (noting that courts are generally reluctant to find such implied
assurances).
5 See Wrongful Discharge, supra note 4, at 1821. Some courts recognize an em-
ployer obligation not to discharge in bad faith, or imply a contractual duty to termi-
nate only in good faith. Id. This implied covenant is the broadest exception to the at-
will doctrine and has been rejected by a majority of jurisdictions on grounds that it
will unreasonably restrict an employer's right to terminate employment. See, e.g.,
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (holding that after 18
years of service employer could not fire employee and deny him benefits without good
cause); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977)
(holding cause of action existed under covenant of good faith and fair dealing excep-
tion where employer fired employee to avoid paying large commission); see also Par-
tee, supra note 1, at 698.
6 See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAw § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1993). The Whistleblower Stat-
ute, promulgated in 1984, prohibits retaliatory discharge of employees who report ille-
gal activities of their employers. Id. This law, however, protects only those employees
who report "violation[s] of law, rule or regulation." Id. Moreover, coverage is limited to
those violations which pose "a substantial and specific danger to the public health or
safety." Id.; Remba v. Federation Employment and Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 131,
134, 545 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (1st Dep't 1989) (ruling that white-collar crime and fraud-
ulent billing not covered by statute because they do not present danger to public
health); Liebowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169, 548 N.Y.S.2d 513 (2d
Dep't 1989) (holding that forced resignation for reporting employer's allegedly fraudu-
lent activity does not meet requirements of "Whistleblower Statute"); see also N.Y.
LAB. LAw § 740 Primary Objectives (statute covers situations in which employee no-
tices dangerous health hazard at workplace, reports it to authorities, and is later fired
for doing so); Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in
New York, 54 BRoom L. Rnv. 1137, 1143 (1989) (statute affords protection only in
restricted set of circumstances, and has little, if any, effect in protecting at-will em-
ployees against retaliatory discharge). Ten states have enacted Whistleblower stat-
utes. Partee, supra note 1, at 701 n.92 .
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trine.7 Subsequent cases, however, have construed the Weiner ex-
ception extremely narrowly, confining its application to factually
identical situations.' Moreover, in 1983, the Court of Appeals un-
equivocally restated its adherence to the at-will doctrine by an-
nouncing that "absent a constitutionally impermissible purpose, a
statutory proscription, or an express limitation in the individual
contract of employment, an employer's right at any time to termi-
nate an employment at will remains unimpaired."9 In the wake of
7 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). The court listed four
factors that created the implied contract exception: (1) plaintiff was induced to join
the company with oral assurances of discharge for just cause only; (2) this assurance
was written in the employee handbook; (3) detrimental reliance in plaintiffs rejection
of other offers of employment; (4) the company's repeated instructions to proceed in
strict compliance with the personnel handbook by firing subordinates for just cause
only. Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The court stated that
neither the "subjective intent, nor 'any single act, phrase or other expression;' but 'the
totality of all of these, given the attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties,
and the objectives they were trying to attain'" would determine whether the presump-
tion of at-will employment had been overcome. Id. at 466-67, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 198 (quoting Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Constr. Corp.,
41 N.Y.2d 397, 361 N.E.2d 999, 393 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1977)).
8 See Minda & Raab, supra note 6, at 1144-46 (detailing strict, post-Weiner en-
forcement of at-will employment doctrine by New York judiciary). By rigorously in-
sisting that all facts fit within the unique "four factors" listed in the Weiner decision,
New York courts have stripped the Weiner exception of all effect. See, e.g., Wexler v.
Newsweek, Inc., 109 A.D.2d 714, 715, 487 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (1st Dep't 1985) (finding
policy in employee manual not enough to sustain cause of action for breach of contract
because facts not identical to those of Weiner); Rizzo v. International Bd. of Team-
sters, Local 237, 109 A.D.2d 639, 641, 486 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (1st Dep't 1985) (insist-
ing plaintiff comply with "operative facts" of Weiner before she could bring action for
breach of implied contract); Citera v. Chemical Bank, 105 A.D.2d 636, 637, 481
N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (1st Dep't 1984) (stating "general policy statements and supervi-
sory guidelines" in defendans manual not enough to imply obligation of just cause
firing).
9 Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 305, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91,
461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983). In Murphy, the plaintiff was discharged after 23 years
of service because he disclosed accounting improprieties. Id. The court was urged to
recognize the public policy and the implied covenant of good faith exceptions to the at-
will doctrine. Id. at 299-300, 448 N.E.2d at 88-89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 234-36. The court
rejected the public policy argument on the grounds that New York law does not recog-
nize the tort of abusive discharge and that the legislature is best suited to reform the
law. Id. at 299, 448 N.E.2d at 88, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
Four years later, this decision in favor of the status quo was reaffirmed. Sabetay
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 506 N.E.2d 919, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1987). The
plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully discharged because he refused to participate
in illegal tax avoidance schemes and then "blew the whistle" on those who did. Id. at
332-33, 506 N.E.2d at 920, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 210. The plaintiff tried to maintain a
cause of action for breach of implied contract based on written company policies re-
quiring employees to report unethical conduct to management. Id. at 332, 506 N.E.2d
at 920, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 211. Adhering to precedent, the court dismissed the cause of
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this reaffirmation, an at-will employee who refused to act illegally
or unethically had no recourse against his former employer for re-
taliatory discharge. 10 Recently, however, in Wieder v. Skala," the
New York Court of Appeals penetrated this previously impervious
doctrine by holding that, despite the at-will status of employment,
an attorney who has been fired by a law firm in alleged retaliation
for the attorney's insistence that the firm report a colleague's un-
ethical conduct may sustain an action for breach of contract. 1
2
The plaintiff, an associate in a New York law firm, was hired
in 1986.13 In early 1987, he purchased a condominium, and the
firm assigned one of his colleagues to represent him at the clos-
ing.14 The assigned attorney, however, neglected the plaintiffs
transaction, and when questioned by the plaintiff, made "false and
fraudulent material misrepresentations" regarding it. 15 The at-
torney in question later admitted in writing that he had commit-
ted malpractice not only upon the petitioner, but upon several of
the firm's clients. 16 Although the partners of the firm were aware
of this attorney's misconduct, they failed to report him to the Ap-
pellate Division Disciplinary Committee, as required by the New
action for breach of implied contract because the employees' manual did not contain
the specific assurances listed in Weiner. Id. at 336, 506 N.E.2d at 923, 514 N.Y.S.2d at
213. It also refused to recognize an implied covenant of good faith in employment
contracts because such an obligation was inconsistent with the employer's right to
terminate the employment at any time. Id. at 335-36, 506 N.E.2d at 922, 514 N.Y.S.2d
at 212-13. The court reasoned that "a covenant of good faith can be implied only where
the implied term is consistent with other mutually agreed upon terms in the con-
tract." Id. at 335, 506 N.E.2d at 922, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 212. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that "'it would be incongruous to say that an inference may be drawn that the
employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his right of
termination.'" Id. at 336, 506 N.E.2d at 922, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 213 (quoting Murphy, 58
N.Y.2d at 3 04-05, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237). Basing its decision on "stare
decisis principles and sound contractual and policy reasons," the court in Sabetay af-
firmed the at-will employment doctrine as the law in New York. Id. at 337, 506
N.E.2d at 923, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
10 See, e.g., Sabetay, 69 N.Y.2d at 329, 506 N.E.2d at 919, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 209;
Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 293, 448 N.E.2d at 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 232. In both cases, the
Court of Appeals dismissed actions for wrongful discharge brought by at-will corpo-
rate employees alleging that they were terminated in retaliation for their refusal to
participate in, and subsequent disclosure of, unlawful or unethical acts of their co-
employees and employers. Sabetay, 69 N.Y.2d at 329, 506 N.E.2d at 919, 514 N.Y.S.2d
at 209; Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 293, 448 N.E.2d at 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
11 80 N.Y.2d 628, 609 N.E.2d 105, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1992).
12 Id. at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
13 Id. at 631, 609 N.E.2d at 106, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 632, 609 N.E.2d at 106, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
16 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 632, 609 N.E.2d at 106, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
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York Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code").1 7  Only
upon the plaintiff's repeated insistence'" did they reluctantly file a
complaint.' 9 Three months later, the plaintiff was fired.2 0
Mr. Wieder brought suit against the law firm for retaliatory
discharge.2 ' The New York State Supreme Court, New York
County, dismissed the complaint, reasoning that: the plaintiff was
no different from any other at-will employee, the facts pleaded did
not come within the Weiner exception,22 New York law did not rec-
ognize any public policy exception to the at-will employment doc-
trine,23 and the plaintiff was not protected by the Whistleblower
Statute.24 The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the
dismissal.25
In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the
rulings of the lower courts and held that Wieder could maintain a
cause of action for breach of contract despite his at-will status,26
thus forming a new exception to New York's current employment
17 N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY, DR 1-103(A) (McKinney
1990) [hereinafter CODE]. DR 1-103(A) provides that "[a] lawyer possessing knowl-
edge, not protected as a confidence or secret, of a violation of DR 1-102 that raises a
substantial question as to another lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness in
other respects as a lawyer shall report such knowledge .... " Id. (emphasis added).
Failure to report is in itself an ethical violation. See N.Y.S.BA. Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, Formal Op. 1990-93 (1990).
18 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 632, 609 N.E.2d at 106, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 752. The partners
tried to dissuade the plaintiff from filing a complaint by offering to reimburse his
losses. Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 632, 609 N.E.2d at 106, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
21 Wieder v. Skala, 144 Misc. 2d 346, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1989). Plaintiff argued that "the public policy of protecting against improper activi-
ties by attorneys" constituted an exception to the at-will rule; alternatively, he argued
that he came within the realm of the Whistleblower Statute. Id. at 347, 544 N.Y.S.2d
at 972.
22 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing rigid adherence by New
York courts to "four factors" of Weiner before recognizing implied contract exception to
at-will doctrine).
23 Wieder, 144 Misc. 2d at 347-48, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73.
24 Id. The trial court found the Whistleblower Statute to be inapplicable because
"the alleged refusal of the law firm to report [the assigned attorney] to the Discipli-
nary Committee cannot be said to be an 'activity, policy or practice of the employer...
which... presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.'"
Id. at 349, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 973 (quoting N.Y. LAB. LAw § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988));
see also supra note 6 (discussing Whistleblower Statute and its limitations).
25 Wieder v. Skala, 168 A.D.2d 355, 563 N.Y.S.2d (1st Dep't 1990).
26 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 637, 609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
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at-will doctrine.2 7 Writing for the court, Judge Hancock based
this exception on the rules of the Code, specifically DR 1-103(A),
which imposes a mandatory reporting obligation on a lawyer who
has knowledge of another lawyer's transgressions. 2  The court,
recognizing that failure to comply with this reporting requirement
could result in disbarment,29 noted that lawyers themselves are
responsible for maintaining standards of ethical and lawful con-
duct within the legal profession according to the rules of profes-
sional responsibility.30 Recognizing the significance of this self-
regulatory function to the practice of law, the court determined
that the rules of professional conduct were so fundamental to the
associate-law firm relationship that they formed the "core and, in-
deed, the only purpose" of their association.3 ' These considera-
27 Id. at 635, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 755 (finding "decisions in Mur-
phy and Sabetay ... not controlling").
28 Id. at 636, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56; see also Kim D. Ringler,
Lawyer's Obligation to Report Professional Misconduct, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 20, 1984, at 3
("In New York every attorney is ... bound to comply with DR 1-103(A) which is
designed both to prevent and to remedy violations of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 'Squeal Rule" Considered for Change, NAFL L.J.,
Mar. 26, 1990, at 13 (noting that DR 1-103, also known as 'squeal rule', is "an across-
the-board legal obligation").
29 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 636, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756. Attorneys
who fail to comply with the reporting requirement of DR 1-103(A) have been penal-
ized with sanctions ranging from one year suspension to disbarment. See, e.g., In re
Dowd, 160 A.D.2d 78, 559 N.Y.S.2d 365 (2d Dep't 1990) (five year suspension for at-
torneys who knew of colleague's unethical conduct and failed to report it); In re Leiko-
witz, 105 A.D.2d 161, 483 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1st Dep't 1984) (failure to report partners'
misconduct resulted in disbarment of nonreporting associate).
According to one commentator, strict enforcement by the courts has led to an
increased amount of complaints of peer misconduct, a fact which signifies greater ad-
herence to, and awareness of, the obligations of the Code. See David C. Olsson, Re-
porting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service to Ethical Standards is Not Enough, 31 Aiuz. L.
REv. 657, 670 (1989).
3o Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 637, 609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756; see also
Olsson, supra note 29, at 658 ("One of the privileges of the legal profession is self-
regulation .... [which] requires lawyers and judges to share the responsibility of
maintaining the standards of ethics and competence within the profession."). The self-
policing function of the legal profession is critical because lawyers themselves, not the
general public, are best able to detect a fellow attorney's misconduct, and the report-
ing obligation is vital in order to maintain a high level of professionalism. See Ringler,
supra note 28, at 3; see also Michael J. Gentile, Reporting Misconduct By Other Law-
yers, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 23, 1984, at 2 ("[Lawyers] are themselves completely responsible
for maintaining the public's confidence in the integrity of the Bar and, by extension,
the integrity of the legal system.").
31 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 635, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 755. Explaining
the tight link between the duties of an associate as a member of the bar on the one
hand, and as an employee of the firm on the other, the court determined that "associ-
ates are, to be sure, employees of the firm but they remain independent officers of the
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tions led the court to conclude that DR 1-103(A) created an im-
plied obligation between the parties that they would not prevent
each other from practicing law in accordance with the rules of pro-
fessional responsibility.2 Accordingly, the court found that the
law firm breached the implied obligation when it insisted that the
associate, as their employee, violate DR 1-103(A). 3
To support its decision, the court distinguished the employ-
ment of an associate by a law firm from the employment of a cor-
porate employee. 4 The court focused on three primary distinc-
tions: (1) an associate, as a member of the bar, has a different set
court responsible in a broader public sense for their professional obligations." Id.; see
also Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 Wm. & MARY L. REV.
259, 266 (1985) (suggesting that if partner instructs associate to perform unethically,
associate must disobey those instructions because associate has higher duty to adhere
to Disciplinary Rules prescribed in Code).
32 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757. The court
used the words "implied in law" and "obligation of good faith and fair dealing" inter-
changeably to mean an implied understanding between the parties that neither one
would "'intentionally and purposely do anything to prevent the other party from car-
rying out the agreement on his part.'" Id. at 637, 609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at
756 (quoting Patterson v. Meyerhoffer, 204 N.Y. 96, 100,97 N.E. 472,473 (1912)). See
generally Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167
(1933) ("[In every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract .... ").
The implied covenant of good faith, as applied to the at-will employment doctrine,
is considered an implied obligation of the parties not to take unreasonable action and
not to frustrate the agreements into which they have entered. See generally Harold
Brown, Good Faith and Fair Dealing Revisited, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1991, at 3.
The Murphy court acknowledged that "New York does recognize that in appropri-
ate circumstances an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the part of a party
may be implied, and if implied will be enforced." Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983) (emphasis
added). The Wieder court found these "appropriate circumstances" which would jus-
tify the creation of an implied obligation of good faith in "the unstated but essential
compact that in conducting the firm's legal practice both plaintiff and the firm would
do so in compliance with the prevailing rules of conduct and ethical standards of the
profession." 80 N.Y.2d at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
33 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757. The court
reasoned that firing an associate because he reported a colleague's misconduct, as
required by DR 1-103(A), "amounted to nothing less than a frustration of the only
legitimate purpose of the employment relationship." Id. The firm violated an implied
obligation to practice law in accordance with the rules of professional conduct. Id.
Thus, in order to prevent the firm from frustrating the purpose of the employment
relationship, the court implied an obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 637,
609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
34 Id. at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (distinguishing Murphy and
Sabetay).
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of responsibilities than a corporate employee;3 5 (2) a law firm is
not the same as a large corporation employer;36 and (3) company
rules allegedly requiring disclosure in prior New York cases in-
volving corporate employees were not ethical rules of professional
conduct governing both the corporation and its employees,
whereas the Code governs all members of the bar, associates and
law firms alike.3 7 These distinctions, the court concluded, war-
ranted the imposition of an implied good faith exception to the em-
ployment at-will doctrine for associates employed by law ffirms 3 S
35 Id. The court noted that in contrast to the managerial employees in Murphy
and Sabetay, whose sole responsibilities were to their corporate employers,
"[a]ssociates are... employees of the firm but they remain independent officers of the
court responsible in a broader public sense for their professional obligations." Id. at
635, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 755; see also Gross, supra note 31, at 273
(discussing special ethical responsibilities of associates).
36 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757. The court
observed that "[t]he defendants in... [Murphy and Sabetay] were large manufactur-
ing concerns-not law firms engaged with their employee in a common professional
enterprise, as here." Id.
37 Id. "The company rules underlying the firing of Murphy and Sabetay were not,
as in this case, general rules of conduct and ethical standards governing both plaintiff
and defendants in carrying out the sole aim of their joint enterprise, the practice of
their profession." Id. (citations omitted).
The plaintiffs in Murphy and Sabetay contended that they were under a corpo-
rate duty to blow the whistle, but the court did not find those ethical considerations
sufficiently significant to create an exception to the common-law rule of at-will em-
ployment. See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 332-33, 506 N.E.2d 919,
921, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (1987).
The employees in Murphy and Sabetay were involved in accounting. The plaintiff
in Murphy "served in various accounting positions, eventually attaining the office of
assistant treasurer." Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 297,
448 N.E.2d 86, 87, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233 (1983). The plaintiff in Sabetay was "a direc-
tor of financial projects." Sabetay, 69 N.Y.2d at 332, 506 N.E.2d at 920, 514 N.Y.S.2d
at 210. Assuming these plaintiffs were certified public accountants, they would still
not fall under the Wieder exception because accountants, unlike attorneys, are not
governed by a code of professional conduct that imposes an affirmative duty to report
peer misconduct. See, e.g., PUBLIc AccouNTr.cy HANDBooK T 29.1 (1988).
38 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 637-38, 609 N.E.2d at 109-10, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756-57.
The court found the implied-in-law exception for associates since
[diefendants, a firm of lawyers, hired plaintiff to practice law and this objec-
tive was the only basis for the employment relationship. Intrinsic to this
relationship, of course, was the unstated but essential compact that in con-
ducting the firm's legal practice both plaintiff and the firm would do so in
compliance with the prevailing rules of conduct and ethical standards of the
profession.
Id. But see Partee, supra note 1, at 699. This commentator criticized the good faith
exception to the at-will doctrine and noted that the majority of courts have refused to
imply this term into employment contracts. Id. Partee reiterates the reasons cited in
Murphy for not imposing the good faith obligation into the employment context,
namely:
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The court reasoned that the associate who complies with a
mandatory reporting requirement deserves special protection
from undeserving retribution for his lawful conduct. 9
Prior to this decision, many commentators had expressed the
need to strongly encourage reluctant attorneys to shed their dis-
taste for tattling.4 0 It is submitted that the court created this ex-
ception to the at-will doctrine to encourage attorneys to comply
with the reporting requirement of DR 1-103. By creating this ex-
ception, the court appears to be putting the interests of profes-
sional integrity above the objectives of the at-will employment
doctrine. An associate who reports wrongdoing is now protected
against retaliatory discharge and is relieved of the dilemma of
having to choose between potential disbarment for remaining si-
lent, and possible termination for blowing the whistle.
that the covenant is an overbroad remedy, that its implication into at-will
agreements would restrict unduly an employer's discretion in managing its
work force; that it does not strike the appropriate balance of employer and
employee interests; that it would subject all firings to judicial incursions...
and finally, that the covenant would amount to the judicial imposition of a
collective bargaining agreement, a move best left to the legislature.
Id.
The Wieder court found that in the case of a law firm employer and associate
employee, "giving effect to the implied obligation would [not] have been 'inconsistent
with' and 'destructive of an elemental term in the agreement," as was suggested in
Murphy. Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (quoting
Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237).
39 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757. The justifi-
cation for this special protection was in the Code, which governs both the associate's
and the law firm's professional conduct: "Insisting that as an associate in their employ
plaintiff must act unethically and in violation of one of the primary professional rules
amounted to nothing less than a frustration of the only legitimate purpose of the em-
ployment relationship." Id.
40 See, e.g., Olsson, supra note 29, at 665 (lawyers who blow whistle characterized
as "snitch[es]"; reporting misconduct "seems to run counter to instinct and all basic
social training"); Ringler, supra note 28, at 3 (noting that some lawyers are unaware
of reporting obligation under DR 1-103(A)).
Statistical surveys confirm this reluctance to report. See, e.g., RicHARD J. ABEL,
ArMRIcAN LAWYERS 144 (1989) ("[Iun a sample of Missouri lawyers, only 34 percent of
rural and 71 percent of urban practitioners said they would report ethical infractions,
and the proportions who actually had done so were... 11 and 27 percent respec-
tively."); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other Lawyers'
Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 95, 99 (1976)
([O]f the 142 complaints filed against members of the [Utah State] Bar in 1974, only
eighteen were fied by lawyers; of the 135 complaints filed... in 1975, only sixteen
were fied by lawyers."); see also David 0. Burbank & Robert S. Duboff, Ethics and the
Legal Profession: A Surveys of Boston Lawyers, 9 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 66, 100-01
(1974) (finding evidence of "cover-up" propensity amongst lawyers).
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
It is further suggested that this holding reflects a change in
the judiciary's attitude towards enforcement of the reporting re-
quirement; the Wieder court is sending a message to practitioners
that the reporting obligation is taken seriously enough to warrant
the creation of an exception to New York's strict adherence to the
at-will employment rule.4 '
Although it may be argued that the court has followed the
trend of some jurisdictions by recognizing an implied good faith
exception to the at-will employment doctrine, it is suggested that
the application of the Wieder exception will be limited to cases in-
volving associates who were discharged from law firms for report-
ing wrongdoing.42 This assumption is based on two factors: (1) the
fate of the Weiner exception, which was so narrowly construed
that it had minimal effect in modifying the at-will doctrine;43 and
(2) the Wieder court's effort to distinguish, rather than overrule,
prior decisions in which it declined to protect whistle-blowing at-
will employees from retaliatory discharge.4
Accordingly, in-house corporate counsel, for example, whose
employers ask them to commit unlawful acts will probably not be
protected by the Wieder exception; these attorneys' employers are
not law firms, but corporate clients who are not bound by the
41 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 636-37, 609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756 (discuss-
ing seriousness of reporting requirement under Code). See generally Olsson, supra
note 29, at 667-75 (collecting scant case law involving alleged violation of duty to re-
port). Olsson notes that in five of the cases, the courts treated the failure to report as
a minor violation of ethical conduct, reflecting a lax attitude towards the reporting
requirement. Id.
The change in attitude with regard to the reporting requirement came in In re
Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 796 (M. 1988). The Illinois Supreme Court suspended an
attorney for one year for failure to comply with DR 1-103(A). Id. Shortly thereafter,
the Supreme Court, Appellate Division suspended an attorney for five years for fail-
ure to report unethical conduct of a fellow attorney. See In re Dowd, 160 AKD.2d 78,
80, 559 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (2d Dep't 1990). Most recently, the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Wieder has stressed their policy that strict disciplinary measures will be
taken against those attorneys who do not report when they are under a duty to do so.
Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 636, 609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
42 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing covenant of good faith and
fair dealing exception in employment at-will context).
43 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (explaining the Weiner decision and
its continued narrow interpretation).
44 See Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 635, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 755
("[Elmployment as a lawyer to render professional services as an associate with a law
firm differs in several respects from the employments in Murphy and Sabetay."); see
also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Code.45 Thus, it is submitted that an in-house attorney who sues
for retaliatory discharge in New York will be limited by the con-
straints of the at-will employment doctrine.4 6
Although the Wieder case is undoubtedly an important step
for attorneys employed by law firms, it should not be construed to
extend beyond its particular facts and circumstances.4 7 Notwith-
standing its limited scope, however, it is suggested that the
Wieder holding may provide guidance to other similarly situated
employees whose professions are also governed by a code of ethics,
and who may be improperly discharged for reporting peer viola-
tions of their respective codes.48 Perhaps as a result of the Wieder
decision, ethical standards will be enforced across an entire spec-
45 Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 637-38, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757. The
court emphasized "that in conducting the firm's legal practice both plaintiff and the
firm would do so in compliance with the prevailing rules of conduct and ethical stan-
dards of the profession." Id. (emphasis added). The court distinguished the law firm
defendant, who was bound by the Code, from corporate defendants in prior cases. Id.
In addition, DR 1-103(A) pertains only to knowledge acquired that is "not protected as
a confidence or secret." See supra note 17. Corporate employers are actually clients,
therefore, the privilege of confidentiality would preclude the attorney from breaching
his fiduciary duty towards his client. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 1043
(IM. 1990) (attorney-client privilege comes before duty to disclose improprieties). The
general rule is that a client may terminate the relationship between himself and his
attorney with or without cause. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health
Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ill. 1986). This issue, however, is not the focus of this
article. For a detailed discussion of retaliatory discharge of in-house counsel, see El-
liot M. Abramson, Why Not Retaliatory Discharge for Attorneys: A Polemic, 58 TENN.
L. REV. 27 (1991); Michael L. Closen & Mark E. Wojcik, Lawyers Out in the Cold,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 94.
46 See infra note 47; see also supra note 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing
termination of at-will employees by nonlegal employers).
47 See Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 637, 609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756. The
court stressed that "these unique characteristics of the legal profession in respect to
this core Disciplinary Rule make the relationship of an associate to a law firm em-
ployer intrinsically different from that of the financial managers to the corporate em-
ployers in Murphy and Sabetay." Id. (first emphasis added).
48 See, e.g., AEmOuCAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETMcs
WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE To PsYcHIATRY 2 (1989) ("A physician
shall deal honestly with patients and colleagues, and strive to expose those physicians
deficient in character or competence, or who engage in fraud or deception.") (emphasis
added); RULES OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS, Part 29-Unprofessional Conduct I
29.3(a)(1) (1992). This provision governs architects and landscape architects, engi-
neers, and land surveyors. Id. The rule prohibits "being associated in a professional
capacity with any project or practice known to the licensee to be fraudulent or dishon-
est in character, or not reporting knowledge of such fraudulence or dishonesty .... "
Id. (emphasis added).
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trum of professional fields, so that a medical doctor or professional
engineer discharged for whistleblowing might have redress in
court as well.
Sharon Garb
